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Brazil and the Middle-Income Trap:
Its Historical Roots
Eduardo da Motta e Albuquerque
This paper evaluates the alternation between catching up periods 
and falling behind periods in Brazilian economic history, with 
data from 1870 to 2016. This alternation expresses the middle 
income trap. A tentative theoretical framework is presented, 
suggesting a two-dimensional process, with external forces 
(basically technological revolutions in leading countries) increasing 
the gap between Brazil and the leading economy, and internal 
forces (basically planned or unplanned internal efforts, especially 
industrial policies) reducing that gap. The historical origins of this 
long term middle income trap is discussed, with a special focus in 
the role of income inequality.
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I. Introduction
Penn World Table (Summers and Heston 1991) and data from 
Maddison (see Maddison 2010, as an illustration) opened new avenues 
of research with new empirical opportunities for long-term, intercountry 
comparisons. In the investigation on Brazil, the Maddison data feed 
Figure 1, which presents the growth of the Brazilian economy over 
time. Between 1870 and 2008, Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita increased from US$ 713.00 to US$ 6,429.00 (in 1990 
International Geary–Khamis dollars). An intertemporal comparison 
revealed that the Brazilian GDP per capita in 1870 was equal to the 
Japanese GDP per capita in 1870, and that the Brazilian GDP per 
capita in 2008 was similar to the US GDP per capita in 1929 or 1939. 
However, the global economy has changed during this period. 
Between 1870 and 2008, four technological revolutions accelerated the 
growth in the dynamic center of the system (Freeman and Louçã 2001, 
p. 141). An evaluation of the meaning of this Brazilian economic growth, 
as presented in Figure 1, demands a broader context, and necessary 
international comparisons are feasible through the data from Maddison. 
A dynamic picture of the Brazilian growth is shown in Figure 2, which 
plots the data vis-à-vis the US economy (Y = the ratio between Brazilian 
GDP per capita and US GDP per capita).1 The trajectory shown in Figure 
2 is a long-term pattern wherein between 1870 and 2008, the Brazilian 
GDP per capita oscillated around 20% of the US GDP per capita (average 
ratio = 0.20).  
The Brazilian ratio (Y) and the Japanese ratio (Y) with the US 
economy in 1870 were similar. According to the data from the Maddison 
Project, between 1700 and 1870, Brazil and Japan had very similar 
trajectories vis-à-vis the US. In 1700, both economies had similar ratios 
vis-à-vis the US (ratios in the neighborhood of 1.00: Japan = 1.08; Brazil 
= 0.87), and during the 18th and 19th centuries, the US economy grew 
1 This ratio (a variable, Y) was used by Summers and Heston (1991, p. 362). Y 
is defined simply as “the ratio of the country CGDP to that of the United States” 
(p. 342). Country GDP (CGDP) is the “real GDP per capita (current international 
prices)” (p. 362). On the basis of this definition, the variable Y will be utilized 
throughout the present paper as the ratio between the GDP per capita from one 
country (Brazil, South Korea, Russia, China, and so on) and that of the US. In 
other words, Y reveals each country’s relative level in relation to the US in terms 
of GDP per capita.
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faster than the economies of Japan and Brazil, with ratios decreasing 
in 1870 to 0.302 and 0.292, respectively.2 The Japanese and Brazilian 
trajectories were similar until 1894 (Japanese Y = 0.251; Brazilian Y = 
2 According to Maddison (2010), between 1820 and 1903, the US economy was 
catching up and forging ahead of the UK economy. In 1820, the ratio between 
the US and the UK was 0.74, and in 1903, the US GDP per capita overtook the 
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Figure 1
Brazil, GDP Per CaPita 
(GDP Per CaPita in 1990 international Geary–Khamis Dollars) (1870–2008)
Source: Maddison (2010), author’s elaboration
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0.231), at which point they diverged. In 1900, the Japanese Y was 0.293 
while the Brazilian Y decreased to 0.17. Japan performed two catch-ups 
during the 20th century (Odagiri and Goto 1993), reaching ratios of 0.43 
in 1939 and 0.419 in 1963, whereas Brazil oscillated around a ratio of 
0.20 (Figure 2).4
With an economic history punctuated by fractures and interruptions, 
the Brazilian economy was unable to achieve stable growth trajectories. 
The growth trajectories were interrupted by turning points in 1922, 
1933, 1949, 1961, 1976, and 1980.
Figure 2 presents the context for the discussion in this paper, 
highlighting the dynamic comparison between Brazil, the country under 
investigation, and the US, the leading country since the 1870s. The 
Figure presents periods when the Y increases and Brazil reduces its 
gap vis-à-vis the US. The gap-reducing periods organize the paper into 
different “catching-up periods.” As presented in Figure 2, the catching-
up periods are unstable, short, and interrupted. However, in 2008, the 
Brazilian economy lagged behind the US economy by a similar gap in 
1895, when the economy was structurally very different. This lag is 
related to the positive side of the middle-income trap (MIT). The middle-
income level is difficult to preserve, and the limited catching-up periods 
were important to, at least, preserving that 1895 level. 
The definition of catching-up periods is important to differentiate 
them from “spurts,” as defined by Gerschenkron (1952). The 
implications of catching-up periods for development have been 
discussed in several studies. For example, Gerschenkron (1952) 
mentions one spurt during the German catch-up. Moreover, Ohkawa 
and Kohama (1989, p. 15) mention three spurts during the Japanese 
catch-up; the first, between 1913 and 1919 (p. 29), the second in the 
late 1930s (p. 176), and the third in the “latter part of the 1950s and 
was largely sustained over the 1960s” (p. 270).5
3 At this point, the different levels of social capabilities may be shown by the 
data on illiteracy. According to Odagiri and Goto (1993, p. 79), “illiteracy among 
the youth was nearly absent by the beginning of this century.” In 1990 in Brazil, 
65.3% of people older than 15 were illiterate (Braga 2015, pp. 31–32).  
4 For comparison, in 1991, South Korea reached a Y = 0.41.
5 The ratio between Germany and the UK in 1850 was only 0.61, and in 1870, 
it was 0.58, revealing a larger Y vis-à-vis the Japanese. In 1913, that ratio was 
0.71.
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Figure 3 complements Figure 2 by presenting data between 1990 and 
2016. 
Figure 3 is based on recent data (World Bank 2018) and utilizes a 
different methodology; therefore, the two figures for similar years (1990–
2008) are different. 6 Figure 3 assists in presenting the stability of the 
Brazilian trajectory after 1990 and suggests one additional catching-up 
period between 2002 and 2010.
The Figure 3 also shows a comparison of different trajectories. South 
Korea reveals a successful catch-up trajectory, South Africa and Brazil 
seem to be trapped between a Y = 0.20 and a Y = 0.30, Russia may be a 
new country in the trap (oscillating below Y = 0.50 after 2007), China’s 
trajectory may lead to overcoming the trap, and India may be advancing 
toward a Y = 0.20. This cross-country comparison is important for 
learning lessons on overcoming developmental traps and establishing 
dialogues between countries.
The two sets of data make it possible to organize a broad picture of 
Brazilian economic history and analyze the long-term dynamics of the 
relationship between Brazilian GDP per capita and US GDP per capita. 
Table 1 presents data from Figures 2 and 3, summarizing the seven 
6 For a comparison between two databases, the Y in 1990 was 0.21 in Figure 2 
and 0.28 in Figure 3.
Source: World Bank (2018), author’s elaboration
Figure 3
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Table 1
CatChinG-UP PerioDs: DUration (years), initial anD final y, y inCrease (%), 











1918–1922 5 0.14 0.18 27.61 5.52
1929–1933 5 0.16 0.23 36.59 7.32
1944–1949 6 0.11 0.19 65.18 10.86
1956–1961 6 0.17 0.21 23.03 3.84
1967–1976 10 0.18 0.26 47.76 4.78
1978–1980 3 0.25 0.28 9.82 3.27
2002–2010(*) 9 0.19(*) 0.23(*) 23.14 2.57
Source:  Figure 1, Maddison (2010); Figure 2, World Bank (2018) for 2002–2010 (*). 
Author’s elaboration.7 
identified catching-up periods. The data on the duration and size of 
each catching-up period contributes to the organization of this paper.
After the Introduction, this paper is organized into four sections. 
Section II presents a tentative theoretical framework that suggests a 
bi-dimensional dynamic alternating between catching-up periods and 
falling-behind periods. Sections III and IV summarizes the catching-
up periods in Brazil’s economic history and presents key features of 
the unequal and heterogenic Brazilian economy, respectively. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II. Tentative Theoretical Framework
Since the Industrial Revolution, which was considered the first 
technological revolution, the leading country has offered a benchmark 
7 For 2002–2010, the source is the World Bank (2018). According to World 
Bank data, the Y was 0.24 in 2002 and 0.30 in 2010 (Figure 3). To organize a 
comparison between the two databases, a simple conversion was implemented; 
the average of the division of the ratios (Y) according to the two databases for the 
years they have in common (1990–2008) was 0.7718. This value was multiplied 
by the ratios (Y) according to the World Bank, and the results are presented 
in Table 1. However, the column “Y increase” was calculated with the original 
values.
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or moving target for followers to catch up (Braudel 1986, p. 546) 
through the succession of technological revolutions at the center 
(Freeman and Louçã 2001, pp. 139–151). 
In the history of economics, descriptions of catch-up initiatives may 
be identified since List (1983) described Germany’s catch-up with 
the UK. In the 1920s, there was the “great debate” regarding Soviet 
industrialization between Bukharin and Preobrajensky (Nove 1992, p. 
126). In the 1940s, modern development economics emerged (Meier and 
Seers 1984), pioneered by Lewis (1984), Prebisch (1984), and Myrdal 
(1984), and was further elaborated by a second generation, including 
Furtado (1987). From List to Furtado, each generation faced the subject 
of development (or catch-up) with completely different conditions, 
technological revolutions, leading sectors, leading nations, and gradients 
of technological and economic backwardness. 
Successful catch-up experiences meant the “overcoming of under- 
development” for the structuralist approach (Furtado 1992). The 
successes of South Korea and Taiwan highlighted underdevelopment, 
a phenomenon which persisted even after the industrialization of 
countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. This contrast between 
a few catch-up countries and numerous persistently underdeveloped 
countries stressed that underdevelopment is a “historical trap” (Furtado 
1992, pp. 37–59), which is not a new phenomenon. As revealed in 
Figure 2, Brazil has been in this trap since 1870.  
Recently, this historical trap has received increasing attention from 
researchers who have renamed it the MIT. Gill and Kharas (2007) 
started this new literature and they present a balance of contributions 
to the topic in the last 10 years (Gill and Kharas 2015).8 A broader 
evaluation of this literature is beyond the scope of the present paper, 
but it is important to highlight the genealogy of Gill and Kharas’ 
definition of MIT, which is descending from a “changing intellectual 
landscape” from the perspective of three important sources: new 
international trade theory (Gill and Kharas 2007, pp. 12–13), new 
economic growth theory (pp. 13–15), and new economic geography (pp. 
15–16). It is worthwhile to note these sources because they directly 
or indirectly mention references utilized in this paper, suggesting 
8 Dias (2018) organizes a comprehensive review of this literature.
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theoretical overlaps that could be further discussed elsewhere.9 Within 
this intellectual context, Keun Lee (2013) presented an important 
elaboration on overcoming the MIT, citing South Korea and Taiwan as 
examples. Paus (2014) organized a literature review on Latin America 
on topics such as how to remain in the MIT. 
Lee (2013) defined economies at the MIT as those that neither fall 
behind nor catch up, which is a good definition for Brazil’s long-term 
pattern during the 20th century (see Figures 2 and 3). 
The long-term approach suggested during the 26th SJE International 
Symposium expresses that movements occur within the trap. On the 
one hand, there are limited catching-up periods when the Brazilian 
economy approximates and reduces its gap vis-à-vis the leading 
economy. On the other hand, there are limited falling-behind periods 
which increases the gap vis-à-vis the leading economy. Therefore, the 
MIT for Brazil, as shown in Figures 2 and 3, is a combination of periods 
alternating between limited catching up and limited falling behind, a 
trend that characterizes the MIT.
The research objective of this study is to understand the dynamic 
forces that have shaped the long-term alternations. Four issues must 
be investigated to understand these long-term dynamic forces: first, the 
driving forces behind limited catching up and limited falling behind; 
second, the alternations between those limited processes; third, the 
mosaic of possible combinations between the catching-up and falling-
behind processes; and fourth, the structural changes in the nature of 
a relatively backward economy over time, given the effects of limited 
catching up and its diffusion throughout the local economy.
A. Driving Forces of Limited Catching up and Falling Behind
The driving forces are investigated thoroughly by the literature.10 
In the global context of growing economies, driving processes have 
basic differences. The approximation or gap reductions of backward 
9 For example, Gill and Kharas (2007) cited Romer (1994), who in turn cited 
Nelson and Winter (1982). Furthermore, Gill and Kharas (2007) cited Bresnahan 
and Trajtemberg (1995) and their elaborations on general-purpose technologies 
that cited Rosenberg (1982). Gill and Kharas (2015) included Lee (2013) in their 
survey of the literature.
10 A review of neo-Schumpeterian and structuralist approaches related to this 
bi-dimensional dynamic was presented earlier (Albuquerque 2007, pp. 675–677).
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economies are based on the domestic efforts of those economies at the 
periphery, whereas distancing or gap increases are the consequences of 
economic advances in developed economies. 
In other words, from the viewpoint of backward countries, during 
catching-up periods, the driving forces are within, whereas during 
falling-behind periods, the driving forces are abroad. 
a) Limited Catching-Up Periods
Two topics are discussed to investigate limited catching-up periods, 
namely, the driving forces of catching up and the reasons for its 
limitation, interruption, or decrease. 
Catch-up depends on the domestic efforts of backward countries. 
Economic history provides extensive literature on those processes: 
Gerschenkron (1952) for Germany, Ohkawa and Kohama (1989) for 
Japan, Amsden (1989) for South Korea, and Wade (1990) for Taiwan. 
The literature on innovation systems was developed to deal with this 
subject since the study on Japan by Freeman (1987) and the chapters 
on Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan by Nelson (1993). Overall, all 
successful catching-up processes involved the formation of innovation 
systems, which are an outcome of structural change involving 
educational investments, industrial and technological policies, the 
formation and development of local firms, and investments in scientific 
infrastructure. 
The basic framework for the developments is a benchmark provided 
by the leading economies of the UK after the Industrial Revolution and 
the US after the late 19th century. Innovations in the leading country 
and in new industrial and economic sectors provide the reference 
point for the catching-up processes. The active imitation, absorption of 
foreign technologies, and internalization of new products and processes 
are dependent upon the efforts triggered within the relatively backward 
countries. 
In economies like Brazil’s, those planned or unplanned efforts may 
be the consequences of dynamic forces that emerge within backward 
economies to internalize manufacturing activities or the consequence of 
well-designed policies to develop specific industrial sectors or the entire 
economy. The next sections investigate the specific domestic efforts that 
underlie each catching-up period in Brazil.
Furthermore, what distinguishes those successful catching-up 
processes and the Brazilian case (and other underdeveloped economies) 
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is the continuity of the developmental processes, the structural 
changes, and the completion of the national innovation system’s 
formation processes. For economies like Brazil’s, Figures 2 and 3 reveal 
not continuity but interruptions and exhaustion of those catching-up 
periods. The limitations of catch-up policies and new problems related 
to changes in the domestic economy may trigger crises that interrupt 
growth trajectories. Therefore, those crises should be investigated.
b) Limited Falling-Behind Periods
For backward countries, the driving force behind falling-behind 
periods is the process of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter 1942, 
Chapter 7) abroad. This “creative destruction” is not a smooth process 
but an intermittent and turbulent one with a succession of technological 
revolutions that shape and reshape leading economies. This topic is 
researched extensively in neo-Schumpeterian literature. Freeman and 
Louçã (2001) reviewed the literature starting with Kondratiev (1998) and 
Schumpeter (1939). 
Freeman and Louçã (2001, p. 141) presented a synthesis of five 
technological revolutions, starting with the “boom” of the Industrial 
Revolution (1780s–1815) until the boom of late 20th century with 
the consolidation of the “Age of the Information and Communication 
Technology” (pp. 301–335). Perez (2010, p. 190) presented a scheme 
highlighting the key innovations that triggered each of the five 
technological revolutions. Presently, there may be a new round 
of emerging technologies (OECD 2016) that may shape a sixth 
technological revolution.
For backward countries, this succession of technological revolutions 
signified the intermittent introduction of new products and processes 
generated abroad, such as the mechanization of textiles between 
the 1780s and 1815; railways and machine tools between 1848 and 
1873; electrical equipment, heavy engineering, heavy chemicals and 
steel products between 1895 and 1918; automobiles, diesel engines, 
and aircraft between 1941 and 1973; and computers, software, and 
telecommunication equipment by the 1990s (Freeman and Louçã 2001 p. 
141).
Within backward countries, the imitation process takes time and the 
internalization of new products is not automatic. The lags provide the 
background for leading countries to distance themselves from backward 
countries, therefore causing the falling-behind periods.
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For backward countries, this succession of new products and 
processes from leading countries signified that import substitution 
processes, which have lags and are time-consuming, must be viewed 
dynamically. The imitation and absorption of foreign technology is time-
consuming and demands investments that take time to mature. Lags 
create dynamics that may perpetuate backwardness. As a backward 
country concludes its internalization of a specific product, a new 
product is invented abroad, demanding a new process of imitation and 
absorption and generating a succession of falling-behind periods.
However, falling-behind periods are limited because backward 
countries may begin new imitation and absorption processes for new 
technologies, which will later mature and trigger new catching-up 
periods. 
B. Alternation between Catching up and Falling Behind
Between 1870 and 2018, Brazil alternated between two processes that 
were neither a sustained catching up nor a persistent falling behind. 
This alternation may be the specific feature of countries trapped in the 
middle-income level.11 
The previous subsection (A) presented the major reasons for the 
alternations.
On the one hand, catching-up processes exhaust the energy of 
backward countries and new technological revolutions increase the gap 
vis-à-vis developed economies. On the other hand, falling-behind periods 
are limited because backward countries may take local initiatives to 
resume their growth trajectories.
The nature of growth in backward countries is determined by the 
diffusion of technology generated abroad toward the entire domestic 
economy. This dissemination demands structural changes within 
backward economies, such as new industries, educational skills, 
scientific infrastructure, and firms. The conclusion of this process may 
interrupt the growth process. The incomplete nature of the catching-
11 A figure using data from Maddison (2010) for the five countries discussed in 
the special issue of the Seoul Journal of Economics reveals that the alternation 
between catching-up periods and falling-behind periods between 1870 and 2008 
is a common feature among them. For data, refer to Appendix Figure 1. Some 
synchronization between all countries seems to occur during 1929–1934, 1938–
1944, and 1950–1979, and these will be topics for further investigation.
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up process gives rise to a phenomenon described by Furtado (1987) as 
polarization, modernization, and marginalization, wherein only specific 
parts of the economy absorb the new technologies. Growth may be 
correlated to the specific nature of this limited dissemination of new 
technologies. 
The dissemination is not automatic; it is time-consuming and 
depends on active domestic forces and institutional changes. Over 
time, as the domestic dissemination of technologies continues in the 
backward country, new technologies emerge in developed countries, 
rendering recently absorbed technologies obsolete. New technologies at 
the center may also change the structure of trade balances, demanding 
new imports, destroying old exports, and causing new problems for 
current accounts. 
C. Structural Changes Created by Limited Catching-up Periods
As each catching-up period is the process of imitation of new 
technologies, the absorption of foreign technologies, and their 
dissemination to the domestic economy, they are related to important, 
though limited, structural changes. 
The transition from an agro-exporting economy to a limited 
industrialized economy is an important change and a new phase of 
a backward economy. The gap (Y) vis-à-vis the leading economy may 
be identical, but the economy is different. Each step forward in the 
assimilation of new technologies modernizes part of the economy and 
changes the modernization–marginalization polarity. The heterogeneity 
of those economies may increase, creating a complex process that may 
provide new starting points for succeeding catching-up periods. 
As technological revolutions occur in the leading economies, 
internally backward economies acquire new starting points and may 
encounter broader portfolios of opportunities (additional sectors to 
enter, new demands to answer, and so on), given the impact of new 
products and processes and other consequences of the overall process 
of “creative destruction.” 
The formation of national innovation system components is important 
to ground limited catching-up periods, and the succeeding steps in the 
formation of innovation systems may assist in absorbing technologies 
generated abroad during succeeding technological revolutions. 
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D.  Different Combinations of the Driving Forces of Limited Catching up 
and Limited Falling Behind
Different combinations of driving forces exist during the concrete 
periods in the economic history of backward countries. Figures 2 and 3 
empirically describe the results of those combinations for Brazil.
As revealed in subsection B, it is necessary to investigate both 
dimensions of the bi-dimensional process: the occurrences at the 
center, or in the leading country, and the occurrences at the periphery, 
or in the backward country. Four basic bi-dimensional combinations 
may occur.
The first combines boom phases of technological revolutions at the 
center (Freeman and Louçã 2001, p. 141) and active catch-up phases at 
the periphery. The boom phases of technological revolutions may offer 
new opportunities for backward countries because the growth of the 
global economy opens new demands for exports. In this combination, 
growth occurs at the center and the periphery, potentially resulting 
either in a catching-up period or in a falling-behind period, depending 
on the differences between the two growth rates.
In the second combination, the catching-up process at the periphery 
may take place during Kondratiev wave downswings or “crises of 
adjustment” (Freeman and Louçã 2001, p. 141), leading to catching-up 
periods for backward countries.
For the third combination, boom phases of Kondratiev waves at 
the center may combine with crises in backward countries, leading to 
falling-behind periods.
The fourth is a combination of downswings or adjustment crises 
at the center with crises at the periphery, with the results defined by 
differences in the negative growth rates. The relative capacity of these 
economies to adapt to the negative effects of crises will define whether 
the period is a catching up or a falling behind. If it is a catching-up 
period, it is merely a gap-reducing period or a “spurious” catching up 
without structural changes. 
III.  Brazilian Economic History: Alternating Catching-up 
and Falling-Behind Periods 
After the presentation of empirical information in Section I and the 
tentative theoretical framework in Section II, this section focuses on the 
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economic history of Brazil to investigate the concrete processes that led 
to the seven catching-up periods and the seven falling-behind periods. 
On the basis of the international context presented by Freeman and 
Louçã (2001, p. 141), the main focus of this section is the domestic 
efforts and problems that shaped those periods. 
The starting point of this investigation, that is, the Brazilian position 
in 1870, is emblematic. According to the data from Maddison, the 
Brazilian ratio vis-à-vis the American ratio was nearly identical to the 
Japanese at Y = 0.29. From 1870 and 1900, the Brazilian position 
further deteriorated, reaching Y = 0.17.12 The deteriorations of the 
Brazilian position from Y = 0.87 in 1700 and from Y = 0.51 in 1850 
were the consequence of the very limited development of manufacturing 
activities in Brazil while revolutionary changes were occurring in the US 
industry and economy [see Chandler (1977) for a historical account of 
the periods between 1866 and 1922]. Among the main features of this 
historical period in Brazil was the late beginning of the construction 
of a national economy in 1808 and the very late abolition of slavery in 
1888 (Paula 2012). This feature contrasts the processes between the US 
and Brazil and establishes the technological backwardness of the latter 
during the second half of the 19th century. Slavery was still prevalent 
in Brazil, while a second technological revolution was occurring in the 
UK and in the US.
The following sections organize the investigation by catching-up 
periods (Table 2, Section A) and falling-behind periods (Table 3, Section 
B) 
A. Catching-up Periods
Table 2 compares GDP per capita of Brazil and the US during the 
initial and last years of each catching-up period.
Table 2 presents two features of catching-up periods.13 The first 
feature involves catching-up periods during crises and/or negative 
12 In 1900, the US had a GDP per capita 1.67 times greater than in 1870 while 
Brazil’s had shrunk 0.95 times during the same period. 
13 Although those periods are well defined in Figures 2 and 3 and in Table 
2, they were interconnected during the history of the Brazilian economy. For 
instance, Suzigan (1986, p. 75) suggests links between different phases in 1900 
and 1950, that with different dynamics, organized a long transition in Brazil’s 
economy from agrarian to industrial (p. 366).
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growth in the US, such as during the three initial catching-up periods 
from 1918 –1922, 1929–1933, and 1944–1949. From 1929–1933, the 
Brazilian economy shrank, as presented in Table 2, but less than the 
US economy, signifying a gap-reducing period or a “spurious” catching-
up period. The second are catching-up periods wherein both economies 
grew but the Brazilian economy grew more. However, note that during 
the last catching-up period, the US suffered the 2007–2008 crisis, 
which blocked sustained growth. 
Between 1918 and 1922, the first catching-up period corresponded 
to important changes in the Brazilian economy. Before the First World 
War, the market for industrial products was “created by the expansion 
of exports of the agrarian sector” especially through “linkages of 
consumption and production” (Suzigan 1986, p. 366). This dynamic 
force in industrial investments, induced by the expansion of the agro-
exporting economy, may be one of the reasons the falling behind was 
mitigated after the initial years of the 20th century. Since 1900, “the 
incipient domestic industrial sector was already stimulating investments 
in other activities through backward and forward linkages” (Suzigan 
1986, p. 75). In Chapter 3, Suzigan describes the specific industries that 
developed before 1914–1918, such as textiles (cotton, jute, and wool), 
hats, footwear, wheat milling, sugar, beer, matches, and a few branches 
of the metalworking sector, all utilizing imported steel and iron (p. 248). 
The First World War represented a change in the dynamics, as 
Table 2
ratio Between the GDP Per CaPita of the first year anD the last year of 
eaCh CatChinG-UP PerioD for the Us anD Brazil (1870 –2016)








Source:  Maddison (2010), World Bank (2018) for 2014–2016. Author’s elaboration. 
(Between 1922 and 2003, the GDP per capita in 1990 International Geary–
Khamis dollars. After 2008, the GDP per capita, PPP, in constant 2011 
International Geary–Khamis dollars)
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the performance of exports from the agrarian sector still influenced, 
albeit decreasingly, the growth of the market for industrial products. 
Institutional changes occurred after the First World War, such as 
limited protection for manufacturing activities and governmental 
assistance for specific industries (Suzigan 1986, pp. 368–369). 
The year 1919 marks a boom for economies at the center, which 
“translated to a great and generalized rise in the price of commodities,” 
with impacts on coffee exports large enough to sustain the fast recovery 
of imports (Fritsch 1990, p. 46). Industrial expansion from 1919–1920 
was explained by the demand to replace obsolete machinery, owing to 
the adverse shock of war (p. 91). 
The industries that developed after the First World War represented 
“the beginning of diversification of industrial investment and also of 
the beginning of transition towards an economy ruled by the industrial 
capital” (Suzigan 1986, p. 261). Moreover, an important change in the 
dynamics of the economy was occurring, as “the industrial investment 
did not concentrate anymore only in sectors complementary to the 
export economy, increasingly focusing the production of intermediary 
goods such as cement, steel and iron, chemical products, fertilizers, 
paper and pulp etc, and capital goods, including machines and 
equipment” (pp. 261–262). 
The second catching-up period indicated in Table 2 combines 
the profound and long crisis at the leading country with Brazil’s 
fast recovery. This catching-up period corresponds to an important 
structural change in Brazilian industries. In the 1930s, the relationship 
between the performance of the agrarian-exporting sector and industrial 
investments was no longer significant (Suzigan 1986, p. 261, p. 369).
The 1929 crisis had important consequences for the changes in 
Brazil. Initially, the impact of the crisis was large, causing a 13.3% 
decrease in the GDP between 1928 and 1931. Brazilian political life was 
divided in 1930, when the agrarian elites no longer ruled the country, 
giving room for economic policies favoring industrial development. 
Abreu (1990a, p. 78) reviews the debate on the economic implications 
of that political change, concluding that, “in practical terms, Vargas 
adopted policies that tended to favor the industry.”
During the Great Depression of 1929 and the coffee crisis experienced 
by the exporting sector, the previous pattern of “industrial investment 
induced by the expansion of the export economy was broken” and new 
dynamics emerged (Suzigan 1986, p. 365). The 1930s represented a 
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“turning point in the transition towards an industrial economy” (Suzigan 
1986, p. 366). Abreu (2008a p. 316) evaluates that “[t]o the conventional 
expenditure-switching policies …must be added the reinforcing effects 
of exchange and import controls. It was of crucial importance that 
there was a considerable existing industrial capacity already installed 
so that recovery could take place led by an extremely good industrial 
performance after 1932.”
Suzigan (1986) presents further qualitative changes during the 1930s; 
42 new firms in the metal-mechanical industries (p. 295) distributed 
into branches, such as agricultural machinery, machines for textiles, 
machines for woodwork, machine-tools, printing machines, elevators, 
and so on (p. 297).  
In the 1930s, a “more persistent and increasingly articulated action, 
deliberated and comprehensive aiming at the industrialization” (Suzigan 
and Vilela 1997, p. 32) started, with elements of industrial policies 
targeting sectors such as steel making and paper and pulp, as well 
as utilizing specific instruments such as exchange rate devaluation, 
revision of customs duty rates, and administrative restrictions to 
imports (Suzigan and Vilela 1997, p. 45).
Despite the lack of a general industrial policy, Suzigan and Vilela 
(1997, p. 45) describes important elements of industrial policies during 
the Second World War and in the 1940s, targeting sectors such as 
steel making, heavy engines, iron ores, and alkalis; utilizing specific 
instruments such as exchange rate overvaluation, administrative con- 
trols, quantitative restrictions, and licensing regime; and implementing 
state investments in infrastructure such as electric power and 
transportation. 
In 1946, a state-owned steel plant—Companhia Siderúrgica Nacional 
(CSN)—began its operation in the framework of agreements with the US 
regarding the Brazilian entry during the Second World War. In 1948, 
a plan for industrialization (Plano Saúde, Alimentação, Transporte 
e Energia - SALTE) was prepared, but it was only approved by the 
Brazilian Congress in 1950 and its implementation was abandoned 
in 1951. Viana (1990, p. 114) describes the use of import control after 
1946, including its different phases and its increasing use for industrial 
promotion. For Viana, this period shows a transition to a new phase of 
industrialization, that is, the creation of industries of electric appliances 
and other durable consumer goods (p. 115).
During this third catching-up period between 1944 and 1949, the 
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Brazilian economy completed its transition to an industrial economy 
(Suzigan 1986, p. 366). In 1947, agriculture and industry represented 
20.72% and 25.20% of the GDP, respectively (Bonelli 2003, p. 375).
Between 1950 and 1956, a new set of elements of industrial policies 
was created that included important institutional initiatives (Suzigan 
and Vilela 1997, p. 45). Abreu (2008a, p. 319) describes the period 
between 1946 and 1955 as “removing infrastructure bottlenecks.” A 
national development bank, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento 
(BNDE), was created in 1952; it is another one of those distinctive 
institutions differentiating Amsden’s “rest” from her “remainder” (2001, 
p. 132). Other institutions’ key for the later deepening of development 
included the Conselho Nacional de Pesquisas (CNPq, in 1951) and the 
Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES, 
in 1951). In 1953, Petrobrás was also created. Those initiatives taken 
during the second Vargas administration represent “the creation of an 
institutional planning basis” (Suzigan and Vilela 1997, p. 33). 
The fourth catching-up period (1956–1961), known as the “Golden 
Years” for Abreu (2008a, p. 337) (Table 2), was the first with positive 
growth in the US. After 1956, an exchange rate reform occurred 
in 1957 with implicit content to stimulate an acceleration of the 
“substitution of capital goods, reducing previous emphasis on the 
substitution of consumer goods” (Orenstein and Sochaczewski 1990, 
pp. 173–174). This reorientation was in line with the “stage that the 
process of substitution/industrialization had reached.” (Orenstein 
and Sochaczewski 1990, p. 175). This reform meant “a deepening in 
the process of substitution, as it reached more advanced levels of 
industrialization” (Orenstein and Sochaczewski 1990, p. 175). In 1959, 
the domestic production of capital goods covered 63% of the local 
demand (Lago et al. 1979 p. 459). 
Suzigan and Vilela (1997) identify the Target Plan as “the first 
effective experience of industrial development planning as the central 
element of a comprehensive strategy of economic development” (p. 33), 
the first case of industrial policy “in wide sense” (p. 37).14 Targeted 
sectors included steel making and metallurgy, heavy chemicals, heavy 
14 For Suzigan and Vilela (1997, p. 37), industrial policy “in wide sense” 
demands “an indicative plan and formal mechanisms of coordination of 
instruments and auxiliary policies between themselves and with macroeconomic 
policy.”  
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mechanical and electric machinery, motor vehicles and auto parts, 
shipbuilding, paper and pulp, cement; instruments and auxiliary 
policies included simplified multiple exchange rates, 1957 tariff, 
law of national similar, exchange rate bonus to manufacturers; 
financing through BNDE, Banco do Brasil and regional banks; and 
state investments in infrastructure; energy included electric power 
generation, nuclear, coal, refining of oil; and finally, transportation 
(Suzigan and Vilela 1997, p. 46).
This period establishes a pattern of tripartite structure of capital 
ownership, namely, foreign capital, private domestic capital, and state-
owned firms. With quantitative changes in the relative share of those 
three forms of ownership, this pattern is preserved until today.
The fifth catching-up period was related to the so-called Brazilian 
miracle (Lago 1990) or the “years of high growth” (Abreu 2008a, p. 
370). Important institutional change took place with a new dictatorship 
initiated with the 1964 coup d’état. Attempts were made to establish 
industrial policies, such as the Plano Estratégico de Desenvolvimento 
(PED, in 1967) and the I Plano Nacional de Desenvolvimento (PND, in 
1972, for 1972–1976) (Lago 1990, pp. 236–237). During these important 
institutional changes, a new political regime after the military coup 
of 1964 was integral to the preparation of this phase. Consequently, 
various changes reshaped the state, including new wage legislation, new 
tax structure, and bank reform. Those changes were a political answer 
to the stalemate related to the end of growth of the previous period. 
Figure 1 shows that the GDP per capita was greater than the level 
achieved in 1962 only in 1966; specifically, industry’s initial growth was 
based on the considerable idle capacity available (Lago 1990, p. 239). 
According to Suzigan and Vilela, elements of industrial policies 
were used during the “cycle of expansion 1968–1973”: targeted 
sectors included steel making, non-ferrous metals, petrochemicals, 
shipbuilding; instrument and auxiliary policies included devaluation, 
raise in tariff rates, import requests, similarity tests, national 
participation agreements, tax exemptions, fiscal credit; and state 
investments in infrastructure included energy, transportation, 
urbanization/sanitation (Suzigan and Vilela 1997, p. 47–48). 
The sixth catching-up period (1978–1980) (Table 2) was related to a 
relative stagnation of the US economy, namely, the second oil crisis. 
This catching-up period is related to a second industrial policy in a 
wide sense (Suzigan and Vilela 1997, p. 33). Targeted sectors were 
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capital goods, basic inputs, telecommunications, aircrafts, armaments, 
nuclear energy, and informatics. Huge public investments were made 
in infrastructure, including energy, transportation, warehousing, 
telecommunications, and urbanization/sanitation (Suzigan and Vilela 
1997, p. 47–48). 
Carneiro (1990, p. 313) evaluates that “the overall restructuring 
objectives have been achieved, albeit in longer deadlines than 
scheduled,” and “to the sectors most favored by industrial policy, 
performance can be illustrated by the fall ... in the share of imports 
between 1973 and 1979.” 
In this catching-up period, another structural change occurred. 
According to Conjuntura Econômica (1984), the value of exports of 
manufactured products overtook the value of non-manufactured 
products in 1978. Chami (2003, p. 419) notes that the exports of 
manufactured products in 1981 comprised 50% of Brazilian exports, 
reaching 59.8% in 2000.
The seventh catching-up period (2002–2010) is combined with 
another important crisis in the US economy (2007–2008). This period 
has a very peculiar nature: a change occurred in the pattern of exports. 
In 2008, natural resources became the main sector of exports from 
Brazil, ahead of other industrial sectors (by intensity of technology).
The growth of  Y between 2002 and 2010 may be under a 
predominantly passive insertion in the international division of labor, 
with structural adjustments determined by an expansive global 
economy. This phenomenon could mean a strange combination of a 
catching-up period and regressive structural change.
The main point of this review on the seven catching-up periods 
in Brazil is the correlation of structural change in the economy and 
limited catch-up vis-à-vis the US economy, except in the seventh period. 
Even when the limited catch-up was associated with the US crises (the 
case of the three first periods, according to Table 2), domestic changes 
were important to disconnect the domestic dynamics of the Brazilian 
economy from the problems of the international economy. Regularity 
seems to be in place; that is, each approximation is generally related 
to structural changes within the Brazilian economy. Each of the most 
important domestic structural changes—transition from an agricultural 
economy to an industrial economy, transition from consumer goods 
industries to intermediary and capital goods industries (limited)—was 
related to a catching-up period. 
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This regularity explains a difficult side of this middle-income status: 
the need for domestic change to achieve and preserve a middle-income 
status. Although no direct relation exists between industrial policies 
in a “wide sense” in those catching-up periods (Suzigan and Vilela 
1997), in each approximation (with one exception, the 2003–2010 
period) (Suzigan 2017) underwent an implementation of the elements of 
industrial policies (Suzigan and Vilela 1997).
Those structural changes were combined with waves of institutional 
building (Suzigan and Albuquerque 2011) in 1808, 1870–1900, 
1930–1934, 1948–1952, and 1964–1980 that may be interpreted as a 
discontinuous formation process of key institutions in the Brazilian 
system of innovation. Despite the mismatches during the catching-up-
periods, those waves of institutional building might prepare conditions 
for growth for successful industries, sectors, and/or regions. 
B. Falling-Behind Periods
The falling-behind periods are 1922–1926, 1934–1944, 1949–1953, 
1961–1966, 1976–1978, 1980–1992 (Figure 2), and 2014–2016 (Figure 3). 
Table 3 organizes a comparison between the last and initial year GDP 
per capita (US and Brazil) in each falling-behind period.
Table 3 shows that falling-behind periods were not only the 
consequences of negative growth in Brazil (e.g., the numbers less than 
1.00 in Table 3). Negative growth helps to explain the three falling-
behind periods (the first period is from 1922–1926, and the last two are 
from 1980–1992 and 2014–2016). Other three falling-behind periods 
were related to positive growth, although small, and another was related 
to a relatively strong growth (1933–1944). As discussed in Section III, 
growth at the center, the maturing and diffusion of a succession of 
technological revolutions, and the structural changes they bring explain 
how the US grows and expands the gap vis-à-vis the Brazilian economy. 
The entire Section III highlights the persistence of relative technological 
backwardness after each domestic upward structural change, that 
is, the Brazilian economy was constantly one or two technological 
revolutions behind the capitalist center.15
15 The systematization of those delayed incorporation of technological 
revolutions may be beyond the scope of the current paper, but Section A 
presents a few illustrations. One example is the steel industry. According to 
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The first falling-behind period was part of an international recession 
beginning in the early 1920s and an exchange rate crisis (i.e., currency 
depreciation) that blocked the necessary imports of machine tools 
(Suzigan 1986, p. 91). Fritsch (1990, p. 46) describes the commodity 
boom and a large trade balance in 1919 which collapsed in 1920. Later, 
it implemented a monetary shock in 1922–1926 as an adjustment 
policy. In 1926, the GDP per capita was at the level of that in 1922. 
As the US economy recovered and grew from 1922 to 1929, the 
combination of stagnation in Brazil and growth in the US explains this 
falling-behind period.
The second falling-behind period (1933–1944) was related (see Table 
3) to an important increase in Brazilian GDP per capita: 29% between 
1944 and 1933. Although a positive growth occurred for the entire 
period, it was limited within Brazil by two negative growth periods in 
1939 and 1942, both related to exchange rate crises in 1938–1940 
(IBGE 2003, p. 444) and 1941–1942 (Abreu 1990a, p. 93). In 1938–1940, 
triggered by the external shock from the recession in the US (1937), a 
Freeman and Louçã (2001, p. 141), it is an industry of the third technological 
revolution (1895–1918). However, it was only introduced in Brazil after the 
Second World War during the fourth technological revolution, with the 
inauguration of CSN in 1946.
Table 3
ratio Between the GDP Per CaPita of the last year anD the first year of 
eaCh fallinG-BehinD PerioD of Us anD Brazil (1870–2016)








Source:  Maddison (2010), World Bank (2018) for 2014–2016. Author’s elaboration. 
(Between 1922 and 2003, GDP per capita in 1990 International Geary-Khamis 
dollars. After 2008, GDP per capita, PPP, constant 2011 International Geary–
Khamis dollars)
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retraction occurred in the Brazilian exports (not coffee). This retraction 
led to a shortage in international currencies that combined with the 
increase in imports and subsequently led to exchange-rate problems. 
The answer was exchange rate control and import control after 1937. 
In 1941–1942, the beginning of the Second World War led to the closure 
of traditional European markets to Brazilian exports, resulting in a 
decrease in the trade balance (Abreu 1990a, p. 93).
Table 3 shows an important growth that is greater than nearly all 
catching-up periods, except 1967–1976 (Table 2). The dominant force 
in this falling-behind period was the recovery of the US economy 
(stabilization from the implementation of New Deal policies) and growth 
related to the Second World War (see Kennedy 1999, especially Chapter 
18: The War of Machines).16
In the third falling-behind period between 1949 and 1953, the 
Brazilian GDP per capita (Table 3) did not fall. However, the growth was 
limited by an exchange rate crisis in 1952. For Bastos (2001, p. 401), 
this crisis reflected the persistent dependence on exports of primary 
goods and the lack of investments in capital goods and intermediary 
goods, which heavily affected the need for imports. Viana (1990, pp. 
125) presents the global context of the Korean War and its relation to a 
new mismatching (p. 128) between increase in imports and reduction of 
exports (especially of cotton) as a cause of this exchange rate collapse. 
This limited domestic growth (Table 3) is contrasted with the US 
resuming growth, which is associated with an expansion of industries 
related to the fourth long wave, namely, the long post-war expansion. 
Therefore, this falling-behind period is explained by a contrast between 
strong growth in the US and limited but positive growth in Brazil. 
The fourth falling-behind period was related to a deep political crisis 
connected to a GDP per capita decrease between 1962 and 1965, 
resuming the level of that in 1962 in 1966. Therefore, the data in Table 
3 reflect near stagnation between 1961 and 1966. This deep crisis 
may be related to an exhaustion of the investments of the Target Plan 
and an indication of the need for further structural change. During 
the initial years of the military government’s implementation of an 
adjustment plan (PAEG), changes were introduced to answer those 
16 Figure 2 shows 1944 as the largest gap vis-à-vis the United States in the 
20th century (Y = 0.112).
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limits of previous growth patterns—changes in banking structure, 
taxation, labor relations, wage policies, and so on. Those adjustment 
policies changed the pattern of economic growth that became typical of 
the military regime, especially in relation to income concentration.
This stagnation in Brazil contrasted with the steady growth of the 
US economy which remained in the long post-war expansion—related 
to the expansive phase of the fourth long wave—and the outcome is an 
increase in the gap (Figure 2). 
The fifth falling-behind period (1976–1978) was a child of the 
contradictions of the “miracle” (especially the intensification of problems 
related to income distribution, probably problems derived from attempts 
to proceed with policies previously completed, such as more import 
substitution in relatively backward industries), problems in the balance 
of payments derived from the international oil crisis of 1974, end of 
Bretton Woods, and the end of the expansive phase of the fourth long 
wave, all of which contributed to the deceleration in growth rates of 
the previous period. The deceleration of Brazilian growth rates that 
remained positive (Table 3) was greater than the deceleration of US 
rates that determined the increase in the gap shown in Figure 2. 
The sixth falling-behind period (1980–1992) had a strong domestic 
determinant: Figure 1 shows the deep crisis in this period as the GDP 
per capita in 1980 was reached again in 1987 and 1996 and was only 
overcome after 1997. Negative growth in Brazil explains this important 
falling-behind period (Table 3). 
The economic model of the military regime manifested exhaustion, 
probably as a consequence of wrong choices in II PND, including the 
conclusion of industries related to the second and third technological 
revolutions, some industries of the fourth, and no effective policies for 
the then-emerging technologies, especially TICs. Those policies may be 
compared with the Korean initiatives, among which KIET, a research 
institute for electronics and informatics, was created in 1976 (Kim 1993, 
p. 228, p. 214). 
After II PND, a sequence of policies were in place that included 
in the 1980s what Suzigan and Vilela (1997, p. 49) qualify as “an 
implicit negative industrial policy” that “resulted from macroeconomic 
adjustment measures affecting industry in the first years of the decade” 
(p. 49). Furthermore, Suzigan and Vilela stress that “the late 1980s 
would be characterized by persistent macroeconomic instability, anti-
inflationary measures and stabilization plans predominated, precluding 
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industrial policies actions almost entirely” (p. 61).
A key determinant of the seventh and last falling-behind periods 
(2014–2016) is the end of a commodity boom. The slowdown in the 
growth rates of the Chinese economy that still persisted in 2015 (IMF 
2016) were transmitted through “spillovers to other economies through 
trade channels and weaker commodity prices” (IMF 2016, p. 1). Given 
the dependence of Brazilian economy on the exportation of natural 
resources (Figure 4), the impact of this Chinese deceleration was very 
important. This change in the global scenario, that is, the end of the 
commodity boom, together with an important political crisis related 
to an exhaustion of the policies from Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT) 
governments (in the central government between 2003 and 2016) 
determined an important recession comparable to that in the 1929–
1930 period. 
This falling-behind period can be interpreted as a consequence of the 
negative structural change of the last catching-up period (2002–2010), 
with the increase in the dependence on natural resources in exports 
and important implications in relation to external vulnerability.
This survey on falling-behind periods shows an empirical regularity: 
the relationship between them and exchange rate crises and adjustment 
programs (or restrictive government policies, i.e., monetary shocks). 
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Exchange rate crises occurred17 in 1890–1892 (IBGE 2003, p. 439; 
Franco 1990, p. 14, for 1891), 1920–1922 (IBGE 2003, p. 439), 1929–
1931 (IBGE 2003, p. 444), 1938–1940 (IBGE 2003, p. 444), 1952–1953 
(IBGE 2003, p. 440; Viana 1990, p. 133), 1954 (Pinho Neto 1990, p. 
152), 1999 (Werneck 2014, pp. 347–349); deterioration in the balance of 
payments in 1962–1963 (Resende 2005, p. 39), in 1974–1975 (Resende 
2005, p. 43), and in 2002; and a sequence of crises related to the 
external sector, especially to foreign debt during the late 1970s and the 
late 1990s—in 1979, 1982, 1983, and 1999 (IBGE 2003, p. 441).18 
Adjustment plans or restrictive government policies emerged in 1898 
(Franco 1990, p. 12, p. 28), 1924 (Fritsch, p. 54), 1946–1949 (Viana, p. 
119), 1951–1952 (Viana, p. 121), 1953 (Viana, p. 136), 1961 (Abreu, p. 
198), 1962 (Abreu, p. 206), and 1964–1965 (Resende 1990, p. 222); and 
a sequence of adjustment plans were negotiated with the IMF and/or 
stabilization plans for inflation control in 1982, 1986–1989, 1991, 2015, 
and 2016–2018.
Exchange rate crises are consequences of the limits of the growth 
process in underdevelopment. Resende and Torres (2016) articulate 
the limits of the formation of national systems of innovation with the 
endogenous process that leads to those crises. The lack of technological 
dynamism is related to the crises in the current account as the “tendency 
to show external crises due to recurrence of its CA deficit” (Resende 
and Torres 2016 p. 750). Adjustment plans and restrictive policies may 
not be the causes of trajectory interruptions, but they may aggravate 
and intensify the increase in the gap. The prevalence of adjustment 
plans, 10 plans according to Abreu (1990), over industrial policies in the 
wide sense, two plans according to Suzigan and Vilela (1997), during 
the 20th century in Brazil might be a component of the long-term 
macroeconomics of the MIT.
17 Exchange rate crises are related to strong movements in the value of key 
foreign currencies. Depreciation of the Brazilian currency leads to problems in 
import, lack of foreign reserves, and difficulties related to external debts, for 
example. Those problems strongly affect the macroeconomic stability.
18 See https://seculoxx.ibge.gov.br/economicas/setor-externo/graficos.html. 
According to IBGE (2003), “The declines and low values exported in the periods 
of the exchange rate crises of 1914, 1921, 1932, 1940, 1952, 1962, 1982, 1986, 
1999 and the tendency to decline in exports between the mid-1920s and 1940s, 
and between 1951 and the early 1960s, can be easily identified” (p. 438).
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IV.  Cause and Consequence: Unequal Development in Brazil 
and Four Vicious Cycles
Why did the alternation occur between the catching-up and falling-
behind periods? 
The main issue is to understand what regularly interrupts catching-
up periods which block further advances in the formation of the 
Brazilian system of innovation. A specific structural phenomenon might 
exist that imposes this alternation, breaks the catching-up periods, and 
repeats the falling-behind periods.
The conjecture of the present study is that inequality may have 
a key role in preserving the MIT or the “historical trap,” that is, 
underdevelopment (Albuquerque 2007, pp. 682–683). Inequality may be 
a strong force causing catching-up processes to lose steam and exhaust 
themselves. A specific pattern of path dependence and lock-in probably 
exists, historically and politically conditioned outcomes of political 
projects, actions, and struggles that shape the pattern described in 
Section III. 
Inequality might be both a cause and a consequence because when 
a broad picture of the Brazilian economy is taken, the images will 
consistently show inequalities. Using the basic variable of this paper, 
that is, the ratio of GDP per capita vis-à-vis the US (Y), Figure 5 shows 
how different Brazilian states are in this regard. The leading state in 
Brazil (São Paulo), with Y = 0.41, is between the Brazilian average and 
the Korean position. São Paulo is nearly four times closer to the US 
GDP per capita than Maranhão (Y = 0.11).19 
Those inequalities in income are related to inequalities in the 
distribution of economic and industrial activities and science and 
technology resources (Fapesp 2005, p. 6–26 and p. 6–6).
Those inequalities are present within states as well, as reflected in 
the reports from the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). 
PNUD, FJP (2013, p. 42) present a map with levels of UNDP’s index of 
human development (IHD) by municipality. This map for 2010 shows 
how inequality is distributed throughout Brazil and within states. For 
19 Figure 5 shows Brasília, Distrito Federal (Brazilian federal capital: DF in 
the Figure) as richer than South Korea. However, it is a very peculiar city, with 
a concentration of above-the-average wages of top public servants (Judiciary, 
Legislative, and Executive branches).
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example, within São Paulo, three levels exist: medium, high, and very 
high IHD. Minas Gerais has those three plus low and very low. A clear 
division exists between Northern states with worst IHD and Southern 
states with better IHD. If we zoom in on those data, strong inequality 
will be shown even at the city level: São Paulo is a city of both luxury 
homes and favelas.   
According to recent research on income and wealth concentration 
(Souza 2016), the Brazilian inequality is a structural phenomenon, 
surviving economic and political changes. With data from 1926 to 2013, 
Souza (2016, p. 221) shows how the richest (wealthier) 1% in Brazil has 
an income share that oscillates between 20% and 30%. Souza’s data 
also show that the richest 10% have an income share greater than 50% 
in 2010; this share was more than 60% in the early 1970s (2016, p. 
221).
Income concentration shapes other features of the Brazilian economy. 
Probably the most important is the permanent blocking effect on Adam 
Smith’s dynamics between the market growth and the sophistication of 
labor division (one of the major determinants of technological progress). 
No less important is the impact on education, given that the latter is 
another key feature of an innovation system. Braga (2015, pp. 31–32) 
shows the prevalence of illiteracy among people older than 15 years as 
follows: 65.3% in 1900, 50.6% in 1950, and 9.6% in 2010. In a dynamic 
approach, those data show that Brazil is nearing what Japan did by 
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Figure 5
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but also in mathematics, English, computer programming, and so on. 
The persistence of income concentration limits in the spread of high-
quality public and universal education is likewise very important, with 
profound consequences for science and technology dynamics. 
Given the high prevalence of illiteracy until the early 1970s, very 
quickly meeting economic growth with important limits to catch up 
further was understandable.
The alternation between catching-up and falling-behind periods that 
characterize the MIT may be a consequence of the vicious cycles shaped 
by the income concentration. 
The first vicious cycle articulates income concentration and the 
size of domestic markets. Income concentration limits the growth of 
a domestic market and the size of the domestic consumer market. 
Since Adam Smith, the size of markets is understood as one key 
determinant of technological progress. This concept limits the scope of 
economic growth, evaporating the energies that would otherwise open 
room for economies of scale and other economic dynamic forces that 
increase the output and reduce costs of production. Given the stability 
of income concentration, this element might be the key of MIT. This 
income concentration is directly related to old and persistent problems 
related to literacy and education, another strong blocking factor for 
economic development. The combination of income concentration and 
limits to quality universal education may be important determinants 
of the difficulties of entering new and more sophisticated industries. 
As discussed earlier, income concentration shapes a very peculiar 
orientation of technological progress that might be typical of innovation 
systems at the periphery (Albuquerque 2007, pp. 682–683).
Those limitations of the first set of vicious cycles lead to a second set 
of vicious cycles: the lock-in in natural resources and less developed 
industries or relatively backward industries, given the continuity of 
technological revolutions at the center, are important to shaping the 
incomplete nature of the Brazilian innovation system. This incomplete 
formation is a structural source of external vulnerability, including 
the relative technological backwardness. The persistence in lagging 
behind one or two technological revolutions has implications for 
the current account because the need to import new products and 
processes from the last technological revolutions constantly exists. 
Therefore, current account and exchange-rate crises repeatedly appear. 
Without institutions to push the entry in new sectors, with higher 
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technological content at each specific time related to contemporary 
technological revolution, the exports are in products with low-demand 
elasticity, whereas imports are in products with high-demand elasticity. 
Periodically, structural external constraints to growth take place. As a 
structural phenomenon, external vulnerability leads to repeated current 
account (CA) and exchange-rate crises. Section IV shows that these 
crises are turning points for many catching-up periods. 
A third vicious cycle probably exists, which is related to the strong 
natural resource base of a country such as Brazil. Those resources 
may be used in a “predatory” way, opening room for the predominance 
of a predatory economic dynamics over an innovative economic 
dynamics. In this innovative dynamic, the use of natural resources 
would certainly be non-predatory. The vicious cycle here would lie in 
the natural resources still open to easy capital accumulation, which 
combined with the income concentration pattern described above, block 
land reform as implemented in South Korea, Taiwan, Japan (Amsden 
1989, p. 147), and China (Drèze and Sen 2002, p. 260) and does not 
push capital toward industrial and economic investment. As Amsden 
(1989 p. 37) puts forward, land reform in Korea was a tool for directing 
“idle capital away from land speculation to manufacturing.” Lacking 
political conditions to organize this way to capital accumulation, the 
predatory use of “natural resources” becomes a repeated temptation to 
avoid industrial investment and innovation. Therefore, a very difficult 
transition is expected from a “predatory capitalism” trajectory toward 
an “innovative capitalism” trajectory.
Finally, a fourth vicious cycle might exist that links those repeated 
exhaustion of specific patterns of limited growth (i.e., the catching-
up periods described in Section III) with political tensions and crises 
that provoke social and economic stalemates that freeze economic 
development while they last. Conservative backlashes might occur 
against minor reductions in the income concentration and actions 
of established firms against the creative destruction that follows 
innovation; this possibility may be another source of lock-ins that 
populate the MIT. Those political stalemates are periods of difficult 
democratic discussions and elaborations. Thus, defining priorities and 
creative policies for development is necessary.
This fourth vicious cycle, representing economic slowdowns and 
political stalemate, might have caused the repeated failures in industrial 
policies since the early 1980s (Suzigan and Vilela 1997, pp. 49–140; 
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Suzigan 2017). 
The end result of those four vicious cycles is permanent technological 
backwardness. The Brazilian economy is frequently absorbing 
technologies of the previous technological revolutions. Technological 
backwardness is consistently renewed but never capable of jumping 
to technologies related to contemporary GPTs. This condition may be 
graphically illustrated by the “Red Queen Effect” (Chaves et al. 2017). 
Although Brazil between 1974 and 2014 moves upward in the global 
science and technology scenario, it basically preserves the distance 
from the moving threshold that divides the center and the periphery. 
V.  Conclusion: Understanding the Trap and How to 
Overcome It
A long-term view of the trajectories of countries within the MIT 
enables a qualification of its definition: it is an alternation between 
catching-up and falling-behind periods. This alternation shows 
economies oscillating around 20%–25% of the US GDP per capita 
throughout the entire 20th century.
This alternation between catching-up and falling-behind periods 
has two major driving forces for backward countries. Internationally, 
existing technological revolutions generate new products and processes 
and reshape global conditions. Those technological revolutions may 
increase the gap between the backward and leading economies. 
Domestically, local efforts are in place to imitate and absorb foreign 
technologies, policies for industrial and technological development, 
as well as planned and unplanned efforts of firms and institutions to 
connect to international flows of knowledge; in sum, policies for the 
formation of innovation systems to feed catching-up processes. Those 
two driving forces are connected, and the process as a whole is bi-
dimensional.
This defining feature of a MIT, namely, the alternation, may be 
caused by the pattern of income concentration that exhausts energies of 
the catching-up processes by blocking the formation of a huge domestic 
market as a source of economies of scale and scope for dynamic firms 
and blocking the maturing of innovation systems extremely dependent 
on educational and scientific institutions to feed the catching-up 
processes. As discussed in SECTION IV, income concentration is 
connected with four vicious cycles that cause this alternation.
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The question requiring solution is how to transform those four 
vicious cycles that cause the alternation between catching-up and 
falling-behind periods in positive feedback that preserves the catching-
up process. 
It is not an easy question and is certainly a multidimensional 
task. A new book prepared within the Cedeplar-UFMG (Andrade 
and Albuquerque 2018) might be one introduction to those various 
dimensions. Its 23 chapters are prepared by researchers from 
different fields of economics and demography. They discuss topics 
such as inequality, demographic and climatic changes, taxation, 
macroeconomics, exchange rate, labor markets, pension and health 
systems, industry and development, and science and technology. 
The answer for this issue is beyond the scope of the current paper, 
but it articulates three topics.
First, lessons from successful catching-up processes: each successful 
catching-up process has lessons of mechanisms, policies, and 
institutional building that shape development. 
Second, a diagnosis of today’s starting point for a catching-up process 
in Brazil: a very heterogeneous economy, with a polarity between 
modernization and marginalization, shaped by income concentration 
that combines high-tech industries with nearly predatory exploration of 
natural resources.20 
Third, a set of policies that would be part of policies for active 
insertion in the global economy. The institutional innovation that 
would probably characterize the Brazilian catching-up process will be a 
process that combines the formation of innovation and welfare systems. 
The welfare system is strategic to improve the income distribution in 
Brazil, and it is a bridge between the innovation and health systems 
through the strategic development of health-related industries and 
sectors. Active insertion in the global economy would require an 
understanding of opportunities that the emerging technological 
revolution (OECD 2016) might be opening now to a country, such 
as Brazil. Notably, biotechnology, nanotechnology, solar energy, big 
20 This polarization may be seen in the data on trade balance (http://www.
mdic.gov.br/balanca/SH/ISIC.xlsx), which show Brazil with positive balance in 
products related to natural resources, low- and medium-tech industries, and 
negative balance in products of high-tech industries. As shown in Figure 4, 
Brazil has exports in high-tech industries as well. 
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data, and robotics are emerging sectors that previous scientific and 
technological developments in Brazil may provide levers for entry in 
those new sectors.21 
(Received 3 July 2018; Revised 12 December 2018; Accepted 21 January 
2019)
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